TY - GEN
T1 - MetaHeart
T2 - 13th Annual IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2025
AU - Zivanovic, Dora
AU - Liao, Jy Chin
AU - Shaikhanov, Zhambyl
AU - Chen, Hou Tong
AU - Chang, Chun Chieh
AU - Addamane, Sadhvikas
AU - Mittleman, Daniel M.
AU - Knightly, Edward W.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 IEEE.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - Privacy-invading biometrics monitoring is becoming a prominent security threat as modern sensing systems move to higher operating frequencies (mmWave, sub-THz), increasing sensing resolution and accuracy. As such, developing systems that can protect or obfuscate biometrics from adversarial intrusion becomes pivotal to preserving user privacy. In this work, we develop and implement MetaHeart, a real-time biometrics mis-information system based on reflective, programmable metasurfaces and dynamic phase-front manipulation of radar inferences. MetaHeart's key goal is to prevent the leakage of a legitimate user's heartbeat biometrics by spoofing fake heartbeat signals at a malicious, radar-equipped, heart rate sensing intruder. We experimentally demonstrate MetaHeart's ability to fake Alice's presence when she is not there and to fool Trudy's inferences even when Alice is present, achieving an overall accuracy above 98%. Finally, we conduct a robustness analysis to determine MetaHeart's required spatial placement within the intruder's monitoring area that would allow for effective spoofing.
AB - Privacy-invading biometrics monitoring is becoming a prominent security threat as modern sensing systems move to higher operating frequencies (mmWave, sub-THz), increasing sensing resolution and accuracy. As such, developing systems that can protect or obfuscate biometrics from adversarial intrusion becomes pivotal to preserving user privacy. In this work, we develop and implement MetaHeart, a real-time biometrics mis-information system based on reflective, programmable metasurfaces and dynamic phase-front manipulation of radar inferences. MetaHeart's key goal is to prevent the leakage of a legitimate user's heartbeat biometrics by spoofing fake heartbeat signals at a malicious, radar-equipped, heart rate sensing intruder. We experimentally demonstrate MetaHeart's ability to fake Alice's presence when she is not there and to fool Trudy's inferences even when Alice is present, achieving an overall accuracy above 98%. Finally, we conduct a robustness analysis to determine MetaHeart's required spatial placement within the intruder's monitoring area that would allow for effective spoofing.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105020966543
U2 - 10.1109/CNS66487.2025.11195064
DO - 10.1109/CNS66487.2025.11195064
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105020966543
T3 - 2025 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2025
BT - 2025 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2025
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 8 September 2025 through 11 September 2025
ER -